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Hysteria and the Bill of Rights
Monroe G. McKay

My colleagues would feel insecure if I didn’t tell a story. It’s a ritual
introduction to anything I have to say. Once Clarence Darrow was asked,
“Mr. Darrow, did you ever get into trouble because you were misunderstood?” And he said, “Oh my, yes, but a heck of a lot less than if I had been
understood.”
Those who took what they laughably called classes from me will tell
you that no matter what the label of the course was, the substance, if any,
was always the same. So those of you who have heard me before might
recognize only a difference of emphasis rather than a change in the under
lying message.
Contrary to popular belief, I always write out for myself a conclusion
of what I hope to achieve. But I’ve taught in Mormon Sunday School long
enough to know that if there’s a trigger that pulls down a curtain over the
brain, it’s to announce in advance your objective. I have an objective, but,
to bedevil you, I will not announce it.
By good fortune, not of my own creating, what they asked me to speak
about fits perfectly into my fundamental thesis: the Bill of Rights has never
enjoyed real, widespread support, though verbally it is almost adored. The
reason is perfectly understandable if not perfectly justifiable: the Bill of
Rights has no practical consequences in society except in reprehensible,
disgusting, frightening circumstances.
When I grew up there were three kinds of sermons in the Mormon
Church: pay your tithing, live the Word of Wisdom, and they’re coming
to get us. That is the entrenched minority mentality with which I grew up:
nobody will protect us, and on the slightest pretext they will do anything
to destroy, inconvenience, or upset us. It comes to me in my adult life as an
incomprehensible shock that in my own community the response to the
Bill of Rights seems to flow from an internal majoritarian orientation.
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I repeat my opening thesis: the Bill of Rights has never enjoyed widespread support. I wish to use the Indian sweat-lodge case to illustrate my
point. I like this case because it arises in a unique circumstance. We’re
talking about liberties—protected liberties—but in a prison context. We
justifiably have determined to restrict the liberty, within the constraints of
the Constitution, of those who are confined in those premises.
What happened in the sweat-lodge case? In an Oklahoma State prison,
a Native American prisoner brought an action because they had denied
him his medicine bags. Officials were also going to force him to cut his
hair, and they would not permit him or any Native American prisoners to
enter a sweat lodge.
To understand the rest of the story, I must give some procedural background. Our court has undertaken strategic measures to solve caseload
concerns. We began to do what we all want but don’t agree with when it’s
done, and that is to implement what we learned on mash as triage. We
have to determine that this patient is going to die, so let him die; this
patient hurts like heck, but nothing is going to happen in the next two
hours, so let him lie here and scream; this patient we have a very good
chance of saving if we take care of him right now. That’s the same problem
we run into when we decide certain cases deliberately rather than accidentally across the board. Thus there’s a body of cases that can be quickly
disposed of with minimal risk of serious error.
Any of you who believe in zero-based anything don’t belong in this
world. If you had the Supreme Court working all year on one case, every
fourth year there would be a clear-cut mistake after all that effort. But we’re
talking now about minimizing the trouble. One way we do that is to send
certain cases to a screening panel. One judge looks at it without consultation and sends a quick proposed solution to the three other judges on the
panel. They read it and typically agree with the choice. So only a few minutes are taken. I participate as a voting member on over 600 cases a year.
How would you like your more serious matters to be decided by someone
who has to divide their attention to your work with 599 other people in 365
days? Those are the problems with which we are confronted in the judicial
system.
The sweat-lodge case came to a screening panel for dismissal. The trial
court said the prisoner was not entitled to any relief. Though a prisoner
with limited education wrote the petition, he still spelled out a violation
of the First Amendment. He even had the good wit to cite the Fourteenth
Amendment. The judge adopted the magistrate’s report and threw the case
out.
It came to a panel that I was on. The judge who got it on a randomslot, drop-it-in-the-box basis proposed to dismiss it as frivolous. But I was
persuaded that it wasn’t frivolous, though two colleagues considered it so.
They felt it didn’t even require an answer from the defendants.
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I wrote a dissent from the order that dismissed the case. Because of
procedural circumstances, the dissent did not get filed. I invoked a court
rule that says no case may be ordered or submitted on the briefs unless by
unanimous vote of all three panel members. I proposed in my dissent that
we appoint counsel and have it argued to a regular panel. They didn’t agree,
so it was sent back into the inventory. I was out of the case. Unfortunately
for my colleagues, it came back through some procedural quirk to another
panel—and guess who showed up on that panel? At that stage we couldn’t
agree on how to dispose of it. We did agree that it was a serious case, and
since it was a screen case, we had the option of sending it to the oral-
argument calendar. The oral-argument panel appointed counsel to argue
the case. One judge, who originally considered the case frivolous, joined in
a decision saying it was a serious allegation of a constitutional violation. It
was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings—appointment of
counsel, opportunity to develop the factual record, and so on.
The original judges were troubled because the word “construct” was
attached to “sweat lodge,” and in their white, male, affluent minds they
imagined a vast expenditure of state funds to build a chapel (a chapel
which, of course, was built for our Christian friends in prison). Had the
judges known more about this tiny, little, strange group of Americans (the
original ones I might add), they would have treated more sympathetically
the arguments I introduced originally.
A sweat lodge is a little place out in an open courtyard where you turn
prisoners loose (especially if they get into trouble in the cells). There’s a lot
of dirt out there, so you scoop out a little hole and heat up some rocks and
toss them in. Then you bend three or four sticks that you’ve pulled down
from any tree around, just enough to bend them over and throw a piece
of canvas or a couple blankets over the top. Then you toss a little water
on the rocks. Now that’s the “construction” that is necessary. The problem
is that in the very setting in which the Bill of Rights has its validity—the
protection of the obnoxious, the strange, and the unusual—it gets a negative response. It seems to me that this response is the flip side of the whole
notion of the Bill of Rights.
Now, let me tell you the response we got from the state: It’s a fire hazard. (I didn’t have to turn to the record for an answer—they light Catholic
candles in the chapel where Catholic prisoners worship at state expense.)
Well, it’s a safety hazard. (Never mind that every prison in the state of
Nebraska has a sweat lodge. Never mind that on my desk was an article
and a series of pictures of a member of the Utah Governor’s personal staff
entering the sweat lodge at the Utah prison.) The problem here was equal
protection in a First Amendment setting.
The final argument on the sweat lodge (which amused me because
I happened to have on my desk a double-bunking case under the Eighth
 nsupervised
Amendment) was that letting these Native Americans go u
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into this little thing—four feet each way with just a little dome—
represented a security risk. I thought there was a little incongruity in that
argument. In the end the court affirmed the sweat lodge as central to the
Native American’s religion and concluded that refusing it violated the
prisoner’s First Amendment rights.
To further illustrate, let’s look at the Supreme Court. The Court has
skeptically viewed Jewish people who want to wear odd articles of clothing in the Army. The Court has skeptically viewed Muslims claiming to be
restrained by a prison rule that says you don’t come back into the prison
during work detail until the work is over. In these cases, the Supreme Court
is saying, “Yes, you’ve got rights, but society can’t be expected to adjust to
meet everybody’s claim.” Why did the Supreme Court glibly toss that off
instead of going right through the roof? The system has already accommodated the Court and their fellows; we have Christian chapels, and we have a
Christian workday schedule. What if we get a request from somebody who
is offended by that? What if, for instance, we get a Jewish majority state?
Guess what the work schedule is going to be? Now I know you’re not threatened personally by that. That’s what troubles me in my own c ommunity—
we are not threatened by that analogy. Even with all the Jewish people in
the United States, we’re sure they’ll never get into one state in large enough
numbers to control it. Even if they did, we could always move to Utah. Let
me remind you of three little incidents that should disturb you in your
majoritarian mentality when examining the Bill of Rights.
A certain well-known Mormon led a successful political movement in
a nearby state by force of his personality. When the time came for his party’s convention, another member of the group suggested that they needed
somebody other than a Mormon to lead the movement. He was offended
by that and asked, “Is there something we disagree on?” The response was,
“No, but we need a Christian to lead our movement.”
In North Carolina, a county organization threw the Mormon softball team out of the league because they were not Christian. One more
example. I got a letter from the dean of one of the United States’ most distinguished divinity schools in support of an applicant wanting to clerk in
my chambers. Thinking he was helping, he wrote, “Now this is a scholarly man, a dispassionate man, a brilliantly educated man. Though he is
a Mormon, yet he proved himself capable of understanding Christian
principles.”
If you’re not threatened by now, let me give you a dictum you ignore
at your peril. You do not get to decide, when the power of government
is invoked, who you are. If you reject that, you do it at your peril and in
ignorance of your own history and in ignorance of the movements that are
afoot in today’s society.
I opened by saying the Bill of Rights by design never is invoked in circumstances when anyone with a majoritarian mentality can gag it down.
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So the founders selected a tiny handful of matters they carved out as none
of the majority’s business. Those who were then in the majority recognized
that there are no true majorities—only uneasy shifting alliances. Any
member of today’s majority may be tomorrow’s hated minority.
Look at the flag-burning case. This may surprise you: I’m personally
not troubled if we wanted to write a statute that outlaws flag desecration.
But let me tell you about the problems you’ll have, however, if you set
about to.
Pass an act that says you shall not desecrate the flag—it will be a crime.
Suppose I put on a T-shirt with the American flag on it—the stars under
my sweaty right arm and the end of the bars under my sweaty left arm,
and “I Love America” and the Pledge of Allegiance below it. Would you
arrest me? Your instinct is no—it might be covered by the statute but your
instinct is not to arrest me.
How about the Fourth of July picnic? Let’s talk about those flag replications that we hang around the table so we can dribble our gravy on
them. Somebody might be so patriotic that they leave their flag out in
the storm and lightning strikes it and burns it up. We know whom we’ll
arrest—the person who does what the person in the flag-burning case did.
Guess what distinguishes the flag-burning case from these scenarios? It’s
the message contained in the conduct.
I’d like to challenge you students of statutory construction to write a
bill that legitimately exempts everything you would protect in dealing with
the flag: a bill that would stop the conduct in the flag-burning case but
not make criminal all the things that you don’t want to make criminal. Do
all this without saying explicitly that we intend to prosecute a flag burner
wishing to send a negative message about the country or the flag—a classic
First Amendment definition.
I sometimes get a little lonely. My colleagues think I enjoy being a
crank and a crackpot. But what I’m telling you today has been the central
burden of my active life. It has been the central burden of my life since I
went to my first sacrament meeting and stayed awake and listened.
We had in my day, as you remember, three subjects: the Word of
Wisdom, pay your tithing, and they’re coming to get us. Living in my day
were children of those who left the blood of their feet on the Mississippi
ice as they were driven out of Illinois. Let me describe us (the Mormons)
from the view of people like Governor Ford, who had the power to decide
with gunpoint who we were.
We were blasphemers. We still are. That is why the dean from a most
distinguished divinity school in the United States would write to me,
“Though he is a Mormon, yet he proved himself capable of understanding
Christian principles.” (That is the thesis of the film The Godmakers.) We
were adulterers. We were enslavers. Unless you are good students of history, you will not know the principal cliché of Lincoln’s campaign. It wasn’t
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freedom for the slaves; it was save the union. But the popular campaign
talked about those twin relics of barbarism—slavery and polygamy.
I recommend you read Reynolds v. United States, written by the United
States Supreme Court. It is still out there and still being cited as the law
of this country. It includes a discussion of the conduct of most of your
forebears, comparing them to the East Indians who burned the living widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands. Reynolds is still the law of the
United States. When the 52 percent majority decides that its interest lies
more in power than in the individual, some of you might be challenged
and even persecuted because the written words of your scriptures still contain the doctrines for which your forbears were persecuted.
I hope I’ve bedeviled you enough. I hope that you’ll be troubled by this
proposition because there is this problem: the time that the Bill of Rights
is needed most is in times of hysteria, which is when we are most likely
to offend it most egregiously. I cite the abuses of the McCarthy era. I cite
the present-day hysteria over the illegal drugs that are used in our society. We are so hysterical that we are willing to insist that the Constitution
yield rather than examining whether there are more effective methods of
achieving the same goal.
If you think hysteria won’t arise again, you can’t yet be 30 years of
age. It happens in society so quickly that we wonder where it came from.
Having been the object of it a time or two in my life, maybe I’m oversensitive and I probably exaggerate. The only way the Bill of Rights has
any chance of ameliorating unconstitutional hysteria (since we’re entitled
to be hysterical as Americans as long as we don’t do it in violation of the
Constitution) is if generously enforcing it becomes a habit of mind and
emotion for our principal opinion makers.
I made my talk personal to those here today so that in your humble
moments you might say, “Oh boy, are we in trouble.” You are the opinion
makers who should be busy embedding these principles in the habits of
our enforcement institutions, in our private dialogues, and in our political
exchanges. If you and enough people do, there is a modest chance that the
next time hysteria breaks out, and you’re the object of that hysteria, the
courts—the institutions that give life to the Constitution when it’s needed
in a practical situation—will be amenable to making it a living document
rather than an icon. I leave you now with my proposition: when the power
of government is invoked against individuals in a way that arguably implicates a right enumerated in the Bill of Rights, we should instinctively be
inclined to give the Bill of Rights a broad and generous application.
This address was given at the Bill of Rights Symposium at byu Law School
on October 9, 1992. Reprinted from the Clark Memorandum, spring 1993,
19–23.
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